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Abstract

The work of Galileo Galilei has, perhaps more than any other singular
historical example, been used to support a huge variety of positions within philosophy
of science. This simple fact immediately yields two questions: “what is it about the
case of Galileo that lends itself to be so easily reinterpreted to fit such a wide variety
of interpretations”, and “what can we say with certainty about Galileo’s philosophy of
science?”
In this essay, I show that many interpretations of Galileo’s thought suffer from
very specific problems and fallacies. These in turn allow a distorted view of
Galileo’s work to be used to support widely disparate positions. Secondly, I argue
that despite the wide variety of interpretations, there are identifiable trends in the
works of Galileo that we can genuinely label as Galilean. None of these trends are
unique in and of themselves to Galileo, but the particular synthesis they undergo in
Galileo’s work is unique and is Galileo’s particular legacy.
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The beginning student of philosophy of science can find in accounts of the
thought and work of Galileo Galilei a maze of often contradictory interpretations.
Certainly, this is true of many examples pulled from the history of science, but it has
been said that there is no other single scientist, besides Galileo, in whose work even
the most idiosyncratic philosopher can “with some semblance of plausibility find his
own predilections or prejudices” (Finocchiaro 1976, 130). Yet for this very reason,
the case of Galileo is instructional on many levels. It can function as a litmus test for
burgeoning theories within the field, or as a foil for existing theories. Taken in a
wider view, the Galileo case can teach us much about the use of historical example
within the philosophy of science, as well as the dangers and limitations inherent in the
use of such examples.
Galileo has been claimed by empiricists, rationalists, experimentalists, and
even anarchists to name a few (131). What then is the aspiring historian or
philosopher to think of the case of Galileo? What is it about this singular historical
figure that allows for such a wide possibility of interpretation? In this paper I will
argue for several distinct causes that lead to misinterpretations of Galilean thought.
Partly these misinterpretations arise by confusing the historical Galileo with what has
become Galileo-as-scientific-folklore, even for well known and otherwise astute
thinkers.
Yet even after separating the historical figure from the Galileo of folklore,
there remains considerable discrepancies in interpretations. These discrepancies also
arise from misinterpretations that have identifiable causes separate from the issue of
folklore. Specifically, I will examine four common problems in interpreting the work
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of Galileo; historical projection, confusion surrounding Galileo’s relation to the
traditions that came before him, a failure to take historical context sufficiently into
account, and a failure to acknowledge the temporal progression of Galileo’s work.
This brief list is surely not exhaustive of the ways in which Galileo can and
has been misinterpreted, nor is it meant to be. Rather, I take these to be the most
common fallacies, and in some cases the most insidious in that they are difficult to
spot and intuitively appealing. In pointing these out, it is hoped that the reader will be
better equipped to more readily distinguish viable interpretations of the work of
Galileo from unsupportable claims.
Finally, there remains one final task. Once we have identified the most
prevalent sources of error in the interpretation of the thought of Galileo, we are still
left with an important historical question – “What, if anything, can we identify as
being Galileo’s philosophy of science?” I take it to be a fairly noncontroversial claim
to state that there are clearly identifiable trends in the way in which Galileo
approached science, trends for which he has received due credit. Despite the wide
disparity of many interpretations, there are clearly hallmark themes in Galileo’s
approach toward science, and I will focus on three specifically: the role of
mathematics, conceptual analysis, and experimentation. These three especially I take
to be essential features of the historical Galileo in regards to philosophy of science.
None of these themes are in and of themselves unique to Galileo, and indeed,
some interpreters have made the mistake of viewing Galileo as a completely radical
innovator who shunned the authority of tradition.1 This is a distortion at best. Rather,
we can only avoid many of the misinterpretations discussed below if we view Galileo
1

Such as Feyerabend, and to a lesser degree Koyre’
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as an essentially progressive thinker working within a pre-classical framework.
Indeed, many of his contributions were so progressive as to change the game for
thinkers who came after him, and this is partially to blame for an exaggerated view of
Galileo as the “father” of modern science. My central claim put forth in this essay is
that what is most unique to Galileo’s approach to science – and the legacy he
imparted to successive generations, is not the historically inherited threads of
mathematics, conceptual analysis, and experimentation, but the synthesis they
undergo within his work.
This essay, then, can best be divided into four sections: first I will try to
distinguish Galileo as scientific folklore from the historical Galileo. Second, I will
examine four specific common mistakes in interpreting Galileo’s thought that arise
even when we are careful to relegate ourselves to a “folklore-free” Galileo. Third, I
will outline the importance of mathematics, conceptual analysis, and experimentation
for Galileo’s philosophy of science. Finally, I will argue that the most important
contribution Galileo made to the way science was conceived for his successors lies in
the synthesis that the above three clearly identifiable trends undergo in his approach
to science.

Galileo as Scientific Folklore

Surely the most common source of misinterpretation of the work of Galileo
that a student of science will come across is mistaking Galileo the legend for the
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historical Galileo. One need not venture very far into introductory scientific literature
to encounter Galileo the legend. Any introductory textbook in physics or astronomy
will contain at least a cursory account of Galileo’s confrontation with the Church that
almost always contains some element of folklore mixed with it. The Galileo that
emerges from these pages is rarely the historical Galileo. As Thomas Lessl writes,
we might think of him instead as a “metonymic symbol of science’s precarious
position in the world, a reminder of the need for vigilant protection from unwarranted
external influences” (Lessl 154).
Luckily, Galileo as scientific folklore generally falls within the parameters of
certain key themes, making it a fairly easy mistake to spot. Lessl, for example, cites
five common and distinct features that are identifiable as themes in the Galileo
legend. These include (1) the scientist as martyr, (2) Galileo as the founder of
modern science, (3) Galileo against the Church, (4) disinterested science - interested
religion, and (5) the Church as anthropocentric (Lessl, 1999).2 Finocchiaro’s The
Galileo Affair (1989) contains an excellent discussion of the last three of the above
list, but for the purposes of the philosophy of science, I regard number two as the
most problematic, and as having the widest repercussions in terms of a cause for
misinterpretation.
That Galileo’s scientific achievements marked a huge advance for what we
would today consider modern science can hardly be disputed. Certainly he can even
2

Lessl’s last point being that the Church was primarily motivated by a religiously inspired
anthropocentrism that sought to retain the place of importance mankind held in a geocentric universe.
Of course, the truth of the matter was more complicated. Politically, the Galileo affair took part during
the Protestant Reformation, and Pope Urban VIII had been seen for sometime prior to the final
outcome of the Galileo affair to have been “weak” toward the protestant movement. Thus the Pope
could not afford politically at this time to ignore a doctrine which countered church tradition, despite
the fact that he had been a great admirer of Galileo prior to becoming pope.
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be considered a turning point in the development of science. However, the relatively
common claim that Galileo’s innovations signify the “discovery” of modern science
cannot be supported on historical or philosophical grounds. Yet it is alarming how
wide spread this misconception is. While Galileo certainly initiated drastic and
lasting changes to the scientific endeavor, it would be inaccurate to see him as issuing
forth from an intellectual vacuum. Instead, Galileo is best viewed as being rationally
progressive (Pitt 88), but still working within the context of his time.
The most surprising part of this aspect of the Galileo legend is its
pervasiveness. Here are two examples from thinkers no one can accuse of an
intellectual lack of precision:
Galileo, perhaps more than any other single person, was responsible for the
birth of modern science. His renowned conflict with the Catholic Church was
central to his philosophy, for Galileo was one of the first to argue that man
could hope to understand how the world works, and, moreover, that we could
do this by observing the real world.
The above is taken from Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time (179).
Likewise, the following is a quote from Bertrand Russell regarding Galileo:
He is, therefore the father of modern times. Whatever we may like or dislike
about the age in which we live, its increase in population, its improvement in
health, its trains, motor-cars, radio, politics, and advertisements of soap – all
emanate from Galileo (34).
In the terms of philosophy of science, this mistake can lead to both an
overdependence on the Galilean case when constructing a philosophy of science, and
a disregard for the historical context in which Galileo worked and of which he was a
part of. Both of these mistakes can lead to distorted treatments of Galileo’s
contribution to scientific thought.
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Yet, there is nothing preventing us from separating the fundamental elements
of Galileo’s thought from the scientific legend of Galileo, and many careful scholars
have done so to great results. However, this is only one common source of
misinterpretation. Even when we have extricated Galileo-the-legend from Galileo the
man, there are still significant sources of confusion. These arise from a variety of
causes, such as differences in the evidence examined, or emphasizing certain aspects
of Galileo’s work over others.3 Yet there are four particular mistakes easily made in
interpretation, and it is these four I want to turn to in the next section.

Problems in Interpretation

Interpretations of the historical Galileo range from emphasizing the role
Galileo had in the implementation and integration of experiment and observation
(Machado, Silva 2007) to claims that “to the extent that Galileo’s case was successful
it did not involve appealing to the results of observation and experiment, at his own
admittance” (Chalmers 153). Thus, before I turn to the question of what are
identifiable features of Galilean thought, I will address four fairly common sources of
misinterpretation of the historical Galileo’s approach to science.
The first mistake is the kind of historical projection that involves imposing
upon the time and work of Galileo a modern sense of science. What we tend to think
of as “science” in modern terms is very different from the “natural philosophy” of
3

See, for example Finocchiaro 1976, 131.
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Galileo’s time. Confusion can arise when we try to hold Galileo to criteria that were
not yet in place (such as can happen in taking as fact the Galilean folklore “father of
modern science” claim).
The method of scientific observation for which Galileo would become duly
famous was a work in progress during his career.4 Yet we should not under estimate
the stringency of Galileo’s requirements for evidence. I think that Finocchiaro, for
example, is mistaken in claiming that Galileo did not really have a philosophy of
science in the conventional sense (1976, 137). Finocchiaro holds Galileo to be more
aptly characterized as an “unsystematic philosopher”, but surely this is at odds with
Galileo’s consistent application of mathematics, conceptual analysis, and
experimentation, not to mention the systematic thought experiments and arguments
found in his works (For example, On Motion or Mechanics).
A second mistake is the “historical context” fallacy. This essentially is a
failure to take into account an accurate description of the historical context of a given
case. The fallacy of misinterpreting Galileo’s relation to authority recounted below
can be considered an off-shoot of this problem. Thomason calls this problem part of
the “missing history of science,” and believes there is a strong tendency among
historians and philosophers of science toward “psychological predictivism”, or “the
tendency to believe when presented with a hypothesis that if a phenomenon is good
evidence for the hypothesis, then that hypothesis (plus unproblematic auxiliary
hypothesis) predicts the phenomenon” (Thomason 323).

4

An example of how this can distort interpretation can be seen in the interpretations of Galileo’s
discovery of the phases of Venus example provided below.
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Consider, for example, historical interpretations of Galileo’s discovery of the
phases of the planet Venus. Typically this discovery is seen as a major step in
proving the Copernican theory correct, and it certainly was. Yet it was not the make
or break argument for Galileo’s position it is usually presented to be in the literature.
Briefly, it is usually argued that opponents of Galileo claimed that if the geo-kinetic
theory were true, then as Venus moved around the Sun in relation to Earth, the planet
would be seen to go through phases, just as the moon does. This phenomenon was
not seen occur by naked-eye observations. This, it is argued, was a critical problem
for Galileo to overcome for the Copernican theory to be considered viable. So much
so in fact, that if Galileo could not account for this problem, his theory could safely
be disregarded.
In fact, Galileo did overcome this objection through his discovery of the
phases of Venus when observed through a telescope. Yet consider; rather than being
the straight forward theoretical vindication it seems to be, without which the
Copernican theory would have been discredited, it is in fact a stepped hypothesis.
Historians usually implicitly presuppose that Galileo and his opponents assumed
Venus and other celestial bodies were intrinsically dark, opaque bodies. Thomason
points out that this was not an unproblematic hypothesis in the 16th century (327).
Whether the heavenly bodies were internally or externally luminous was a source of
debate since the Greeks. Thus, if Venus was not seen to exhibit phases, it was not a
death sentence for Copernican theory. It could, after all, be self-luminous. As
Thomason writes,
Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler all understood that there were two
problematic hypothesis: (1) Venus revolves around the Sun and (2) Venus is
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an opaque, intrinsically dark body. Neither hypothesis by itself makes the
prediction that Venus has phases like the moon. But, given Galileo’s
telescopic reports of the phases of Venus, an astronomer could insist that the
phases were strong evidence for one of the hitherto problematic hypotheses
only if he acknowledged that the observations were strong evidence for the
other as well. (328).
Despite the fact that Galileo, Kepler, and Copernicus all recognized the nature
of this argument, Galileo’s arguments are often presented as if the phases of Venus
were a predicted phenomenon of the Copernican theory, when in fact they were not.
This is a particularly clear example of the historical context fallacy. Thomason
imagines the philosopher’s or historian’s line of thinking to progress thusly: “The
Copernican hypothesis must predict the phases of Venus – why else would the phases
have been such an excellent evidence for it? Further, since the prediction is so
obvious, some Copernicans must have made it” (330). This is a precise example of
the kinds of distortions that can occur by failing to take into adequate account the
historical context in which Galileo worked.
A third source of misinterpretation which can be considered a kind of offshoot of the “historical context fallacy lies in misconstruing Galileo’s relationship to
the philosophies that came before him. Feyerabend, for example, saw Galileo as a
radical who rejected all previous theories. He believes it was due to this radical
rejection that Galileo was a successful scientist, and used this interpretation to support
his anarchistic theory of the philosophy of science (Feyerabend, 130). Feyerabend
does make an important point in that it is clear that Galilean arguments were not
based on the authority of Aristotle or the biblical apostles, and using the case of
Galileo to support empiricism certainly poses serious problems (Godfrey-Smith 113).

Gavin 12

Moreover, there were at least intuitively excellent reasons for doubting the
Copernican theory that were scientifically sound (Finocchiaro 1989).
To name just a few of the most obvious, the relative sizes of the planets in
relation to Earth do not appear to change to the naked eye, which they would if they
and the Earth were rotating about the sun. Likewise the planet Venus should exhibit
phases similar to the moon if the heliocentric theory were correct and this was not
observed. Similarly, there was no observation of stellar parallax which would have
been predicted on the Copernican model. Also, if the Earth were a planet, like the
other observable planets, it would stand to reason that the features of those planets
should be similar to the features of the Earth, yet they appear not only featureless, but
luminous. The telescope which Galileo used to obtained his findings was a new and
relatively untested instrument. And of course, there is the matter of our senses telling
us that we are not moving. Thus for the Copernican theory to be the case, our senses
must be deceiving us. These are just a few of many examples of why it would have
been sound on the basis of direct evidence to doubt Galileo’s claims.
Certainly then, Galileo was rejecting much authority and tradition in
proposing these “new” ideas. Yet the claim that Galileo rejected all authority that
came before him cannot be historically supported. As Pitt points out, “in rejecting
Aristotle’s theory of motion, Galileo was also rejecting an entire mode of explanation.
But he did not reject everything in the broader Greek tradition” (Pitt 93). For
example, while it is of course true that Galileo threw out traditional Aristotelian
conceptions of physics, it’s also true that he relied very heavily on Archimedes and
others within the classical Greek tradition (101). Moreover, I think Pitt has made a

Gavin 13

convincing case that a much more historically realistic approach Galileo is to view
him as a dynamically progressive thinker.
That is, Galileo (and other early scientific innovators such as members of the
Royal Society) are best viewed in a context of progressive rationality. They were
“attempting to articulate a new view to replace the old characterization of science”
(92). Essentially, I hold Drake to be correct when he argues that Galileo “agreed that
in order to become science, philosophy must throw out blind respect for authority; but
he also saw that neither observation, nor reasoning, nor the use of mathematics could
be thrown out along with this. True philosophy had to be built upon the interplay of
all three, and no combination could supply the absence of any one of them” (Drake
1957, 223-224).
Finally, a fourth source of confusion that can arise in the interpretation of the
thought of Galileo when a scholar attempts to view the work of Galileo as a single
whole without regard to the temporal progression of Galileo’s thought. It is important
to remember just how much Galileo’s thought and his rational justifications for his
own work developed over time, even leading in some cases to a repudiation of an
earlier view.5

A brief summary of what we’ve discussed thus far: by far the most pervasive
(and easily avoidable) source of misinterpretation of the thought of Galileo is
confusing Galileo as scientific folklore with the historical Galileo. Yet even when
this pitfall is avoided, there remain common sources of confusion. What I take to be

5

An example is included below, in which Galileo’s later views on the relative speeds of falling bodies
contradicts an earlier view espoused in De Motu.
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the four most common include transposing our criteria for what comprises “science”
onto Galileo’s time, the “historical context fallacy” – essentially a failure to remain
sufficiently aware of the context in which Galileo worked, a misunderstanding of the
relation of Galileo to the traditions that came before him (such as Archimedean
geometry), and a failure to acknowledge the temporal development of Galileo’s
views.
Yet, if all of these errors are avoided, we are still left with an important
question. Given that Galileo philosophy of science can and has been so prevalently
and readily misinterpreted, a natural question to ask is whether or not there are any
features of Galilean thought that we can with some sufficient degree of certainty
accurately attribute to the historical Galileo. In fact there are readily apparent themes
running throughout his work, and this is the topic of the next section.

Features of Galilean thought

Having now identified some of the more common misconceptions in
characterizing Galileo’s thought within a framework of philosophy of science, we
may look to what positive features of his thought we can definitely establish. Despite
the above sources of misinterpretation, with careful reading there are features of
Galilean thought which are easily recognizable. Most immediately apparent are three
themes that run throughout his work – mathematics, experiment, and conceptual
analysis.
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Yet these three alone are not the entire story; we must also look to what may
be the most uniquely Galilean feature of his conception of science - the intricate
interplay between experiment, mathematics, and conceptual analysis. In the
following sections, I will examine the role of each of these three themes within the
structure of Galileo’s methodology, before finally examining what can be said
regarding the interplay between the three. Specifically, my thesis here is that while
these three themes are easily recognizable, they in and of themselves are not unique
to the Galilean endeavor. Yet when we understand the role each played individually
within his approach to science, a picture emerges in which we can see what was
unique, and this is the way in which Galileo combines these strands. It is this that
most influenced his scientific successors.

The Role of Mathematics
For Galileo mathematics (and geometry in particular) played a pervasive and
crucial role, serving as a kind of metaphysical basis for his scientific endeavors.
Mathematics was foundational, and here again we see his appreciation for antiquity.
He writes “If I were again beginning my studies, I would follow the advice of Plato
and start with mathematics.” Like Kepler, Galileo saw mathematics as the key to
understanding the language of nature. He was no doubt influenced by Pythagorean
and Neo-Platonic thought (Derry 61). The following famous quote illustrates the
degree of importance Galileo placed on geometry:
Philosophy is written in this grand book the universe, which stands
continually open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one
first learns to comprehend the language and to read the alphabet in which it is
composed. It is written in the language of mathematics, and its characters are
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triangles, circles, and other geometric figures without which it is humanly
impossible to understand a single word of it; without these, one wanders about
in a dark labyrinth (Galileo 237-38).
It is easy to find throughout the thought of Galileo this use of mathematics as
a kind of basis upon which to build and organize the remainder of his conceptual
work. The recognition of the importance of the role mathematics played for Galileo
has been a key starting point for many authors dealing with his work. Pitt, for
example has argued that for Galileo, geometry served as a “touchstone for certainty in
a world of infinite variation and magnitude that he has been partially responsible for
bringing to our attention” (96). Geometry was the unchanging universal constant
truth against which his exegesis could explain the results of experimentation. It thus
provided the metaphysical foundation for his philosophy of science. To the degree
that Galileo was convinced of the rationality of his method, it was due to his use of
geometry (101).

Conceptual Analysis
Conceptual analysis and explanation were equally crucial for Galileo. Indeed,
it is in his conception of what a proper explanation of physical phenomena entailed
that was one of the most important parts of his legacy. His theory of conceptual
analysis involves both a geometric proof (the language of the Universe), and an
explanation which accompanies and interprets it. In a sense, we might think of
Galileo’s conceptual analysis as serving a mediating role which brings the universal
truth of geometry to the realm of concrete empirical knowledge.
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If mathematics served for Galileo the function of a “touchstone for certainty in
a world of infinite variation and magnitude,” then conceptual analysis and
explanation were a way of bringing the truths written in mathematics more directly
into understanding; that is, explanation expounded on mathematical truths and made
them more fully graspable. Thus we find Galileo writing, “Facts which at first seem
improbable will, even on scant explanation, drop the cloak which has hidden them
and stand forth in simple and naked beauty.”
On this view Galileo is essentially an explanationist for whom a hypothesis is
justified by having suitable explanatory power. Consider, for example, Galileo’s
discoveries related to pendulums. His chief contribution here was the claim that the
period of swing of a pendulum was independent of its amplitude. This hypothesis is
justified in that it adequately explains the observed phenomena, and can be expressed
mathematically, in that the square of the period of swing varies directly with the
length.
The importance of explanation and conceptual analysis for Galileo has led
some philosophers to undervalue the role of experimentation for Galileo. One
striking example would be Alexandre Koyre who went so far as to write that “It is
obvious that the Galilean experiments are completely worthless: the very perfection
of their results is a rigorous proof of their incorrection” (Koyre 1968, 94). This was
in reference to Galileo’s famous experiments using an inclined plane (see below).
This surely goes too far, however. While it is true that much of Galileo’s work in this
area can be considered something of a thought experiment, Galileo did indeed
perform experiments on incline plains, and these results did inform his theories.
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The above case of his work with pendulums is an even better example.
Galileo posited that the period of swing of a pendulum was isochronous and
independent of its amplitude. Neither of these claims are strictly true. The period of
swing does vary somewhat with the amplitude of the swing. Yet the results are still
too accurate to justify throwing out the experiment altogether as worthless. It would
be more accurate to say that the periods differ very little. So little in fact, that
Galileo’s observations led to the development of vastly improved time keeping
devices, some of which (the familiar grandfather clock) we still use.
Yet it is true that often Galileo’s experiments are more thought experiment
than empirical in nature. Moreover, there is a valid question we might ask here –
given the role of mathematics and conceptual analysis for Galileo, where does
experimental data fit in to the picture? Maarten Van Dyck frames this as what he
calls the “paradox of conceptual novelty.” That is, “where do Galileo’s new concepts
come from, if they cannot be abstracted from experimentally established regularities?
Whence conceptual novelty?”
I would argue that Van Dyck’s use of the phrase “conceptual novelty” can be
misleading here, as it lends itself to the fallacy outlined above of failing to take into
consideration the historical framework in which Galileo’s work takes place, but I am
happy to agree with him that what is “novel” about Galileo’s work is his ability to
produce theorems in terms of classical mechanics using a pre-classical conceptual
apparatus (Van Dyck, 866). The point is again simply that Galileo’s work did not
arise from a historical vacuum. Yet his theorems were radical enough that for those
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that came after, that it could easily seem as though they were a clean break from the
historical framework in which they arose. Damerow writes,
Thus, while for the first discoverer, the law of free fall is achieved by applying
and modifying an independently grounded, pre-existing conceptual system,
for his disciples it is the law of fall that canonically defines key concepts in a
new conceptual system. The very same reading of these theorems that
establishes classical mechanics also obliterates the traces of its real historical
genesis because the original problems that the concepts involved are now
understood within a very different theoretical and semantic framework. But
since the successors themselves derive the inherited theorems on the basis of
the new concepts, they impute these concepts to the discoverers. (Damerow et
al. 2004, 5)
In essence, Galileo was developing his science contemporaneously with a preclassical conceptual system, and it did represent a break with that system for thinkers
that came after him.

The Role of Experimentation
Finally, we turn to the question of exactly what role experimentation did play
for Galileo before discussing how mathematics, conceptual analysis and
experimentation synthesize into a whole. While it is certainly going too far to say
that Galileo’s experiments were worthless, it is fair to say that many experiments
(such as those in which he abstracts from a perfectly smooth inclined plain) never
were, nor could they ever be, perfectly performed in reality before Galileo reported
results. Yet this is not to say that Galileo did not perform any experiments. In fact it
seems he held experimentation to (at least some of the time) be a starting point for
inquiry, writing, “I think that in the discussion of natural problems we ought to begin
not with the Scriptures, but with experimentation and demonstration.”
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In his experiments on the speeds of falling bodies, Galileo eventually
observed that bodies of different weights falling in a semi resistant substance such as
water fall at different speeds. He realized that this variation was a result of the
differing densities of the objects reacting to the resistance of the medium through
which they passed, since he had already established that, contra Aristotle, falling
bodies of different weights will still fall at the same speeds. This led him to ask, what
would happen if two bodies were to fall in a perfect vacuum, with no resisting
medium at all.
After seeing that objects with varying densities pass through liquid at varying
speeds, he notes that “Having observed this I came to the conclusion that in a medium
totally devoid of resistance all bodies would fall at the same speed” (Galileo 116).
Obviously, Galileo could not have performed experiments in a perfect vacuum, but it
is important to note that he is not only here contradicting Aristotle, but also his own
earlier view in his work De Motu. Van Dyck points out that in this earlier work,
Galileo had modeled the phenomenon of free fall on hydrostatic phenomena, claiming
that the speed of a falling body is proportional to the difference between its specific
gravity and the medium’s specific gravity… This model would imply that in a void,
the speeds of different bodies would stand in the same ratio as their specific gravities,
and that the differences in speed should become less perceptible in more resisting
media. (869)
In essence, Galileo’s later view has been constrained by empirical
information, and it is in this that we can most clearly see the role that experimentation
played for Galileo. While his experimental program may not have been what we
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would today call purely empirically derived, it nonetheless did serve a function
toward conceptual analysis that was sometimes constraining in nature, and sometimes
informative.
The above account of the evolution of Galileo’s views about the speeds of
falling bodies in a vacuum is an example of how experimentation served a
constraining role on explanation, in that we emerge with a picture in which Galileo
contemplates bodies falling in a pure vacuum and derives results. While these results
are an extrapolation, there is some empirical evidence for why the conclusion of this
extrapolation might be the case. This is why Van Dyck states that in using
extrapolations as empirical evidence, Galileo “has shown how to separate the pure
phenomenon from possible disturbances, how to retract a meaningful signal from the
noisy actual behavior. To put it in a language relevant for the discussions on
conceptual novelty: Galileo has experimentally secured the reference of his
theoretical models” (871).
This is surely a debatable claim, yet the point stands that while many of
Galileo’s “experiments” were certainly not strictly empirically accurate (consider the
variation of pendulums swings, are the impossibility Galileo of actually performing
an experiment on falling bodies in a vacuum), Galileo had enough evidence from
actual experiments to draw a general conclusion or principle. That is, he had enough
evidence to “secure a reference” for his theoretical models. My argument here is that
this view of experimentation as serving a constraining or informative function is the
best way to view its role in relation to the previously discussed features of Galilean
thought – mathematics and explanation.
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Synthesis
We can now point to three distinct features of Galileo’s conception of science
– specifically, mathematics as a touchstone for certainty, experimentation, and
conceptual analysis. I would argue that what is historically unique about Galileo’s
approach is the synthesis of these three features. Indeed, my supposition is that if we
are to seek what was most unique in Galileo’s approach to science and what feature
of this approach was most influential for his successors, it is in the interplay between
these three themes that we must look. It is the pairing of mathematical reasoning with
experiment and observation that was Galileo’s chief contributions to the way science
was to be conceived in the 17th century. Consider, for example, his discovery that
d1/d2=t12/t22: that distance is proportional to the square of time, d=k X t2 (Gower 1997,
937).
Briefly, Galileo claimed that an object’s speed increases as it falls, but the rate
at which it increases in speed stays constant. Thus a falling body gains equal amounts
of velocity in equal amounts of time. To test this Galileo replaced falling bodies with
balls rolling down an inclined plane, writing "In order to make use of motions as slow
as possible ... I also thought of making moveable objects descend along an inclined
plane not much raised above the horizontal" (Galileo, 1954). This allowed him to
measure the velocity of the balls indirectly by measuring the distance a ball would
travel over a set amount of time. The square of the time needed for the ball to
complete its journey was then shown to be proportional to the distance it travelled.
So if a ball were released down a sloped plane and travelled for three seconds, it
would travel 9 times as far as it would have if it had been stopped after only one
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second of travel (Hewitt, 155).
In fact, much can be said about this particular discovery as an example
Galileo’s philosophy of science. In essence, for Galileo, results are to be framed
geometrically, as a harmonious equation is the surest sign of certainty and
correspondence with reality. Yet this somewhat theoretical mathematical framework
or sketch must be explained by a conceptual analysis that admits of empirical
correspondence. This is especially evident in the Dialogue. Indeed, Pitt holds the
Dialogue as containing the heart of Galileo’s philosophy of science. He writes “if we
read the Dialogue as an articulation of a new view of justification as explanation and
simultaneously as a defense of Galileo’s own approach to explanation, we will also be
able to account for what, on more standard interpretations, appear to be tensions and
conflicts within Galileo’s work” (90). He regards the geometric aspect of the proof as
an “explanatory sketch” which can be “filled in by appeal to empirical
correspondence” (100).
On this view, Galileo’s philosophy of science arises from the interplay
between the identifiable aspects of the thought of the historical Galileo. Not only
does it provide an adequate account of the role of mathematics, it does not at first
glance fall prey to any of the identifiable mistakes discussed early. Moreover, it
connects the role of Galileo’s exegesis and experimentation with his use of
mathematics as a metaphysical base.
Furthermore, this conception of the interplay between mathematics,
conceptual analysis, and experimentation retains the innovative nature of this system
of thought without having to label Galileo an intellectual anarchist or ignore his
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historical influences. As Pitt notes, “since the use of geometry as an appropriate tool
for describing the heavens was not disputed, and since geometry was equally well
accepted for terrestrial purposes, Galileo did in fact have the foundation for a unified
general theory. By appeal to the traditions of both Ptolemy and Archimedes he also
had authority behind him” (101).

In conclusion, the case of Galileo has much to teach about the role of
historical example within the philosophy of science. Certainly we cannot discount
case studies such as this from significant theories within the field. That is, we would
expect any viable philosophy of science to be able to give an adequate account of
Galileo’s innovations (Chalmers 142). Yet there are dangers in relying too heavily on
historical examples to develop a philosophy of science, especially if there is an overreliance on a single historical example.
Case studies within the philosophy of science can also pose methodological
problems. The fact that Galileo has been used to support such a wide range of
divergent views within the field is proof that focusing on case studies presents the
danger of only selecting those historical examples which tend to support favored
theories (Vicedo 492). Yet these methodological problems can be avoided by
carefully balancing scholasticism with historical context and by recognizing that any
single case study is part of a wider class of historical occurrences. No one example
can provide sufficient evidence for a philosophy of science.
An understanding of the outline of the history of science is indispensable to
the philosophy of science, though not exclusively so. Science, after all, is a historical
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enterprise, and theories historical entities. Marga Vicedo sums this point up concisely
when she writes “Our epistemic values and our understanding of the world are the
results of the contingent facts of history. This is why the history of science is relevant
to the philosophy of science. After all, in history we may find reasons that logic
alone cannot show us” (Vicedo 495).
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